From Chad to the Continent: How African Leaders Bypass Presidential Term Limits

Introduction

Chad is moving closer to allowing its president to serve an unlimited number of terms after the lower house of Parliament approved significant constitutional amendments last week. Opposition leaders have warned that these changes, which could strengthen President Mahamat Idriss Déby’s hold on power, pose a serious threat to democracy. The National Assembly overwhelmingly passed the revisions on Monday, and they are scheduled for a final vote in the Senate on 13 October. If approved, the president will enact the amendments into law.

Among the key changes, the presidential term is extended from five to seven years, with no limit on renewals. Malloum Yoboïdé Djeraki, leader of the opposition Social Democratic Party for a Change of Power (PDSA) and a member of the parliamentary committee reviewing the amendments, expressed surprise at their scale. “They described it as a technical revision, but it turned out to be a profound alteration of the Constitution,” he stated. Djeraki was among sixteen MPs who boycotted the vote, which saw 171 out of 188 lawmakers approve the reform, with one abstention.

Prominent opposition figure and former prime minister Albert Pahimi Padacké remarked that Chad was “choosing to abandon the democratic path.” He added, “The government seems to be moving too quickly. We risk witnessing the erosion of democracy in our country.” The reform clearly benefits President Déby, who took power in 2021 following the death of his father, Idriss Déby Itno, a long-standing leader who was killed while visiting troops in northern Chad. Déby secured victory in a contested election in May 2024, following three years of military rule, and parliamentary elections in December handed his party a commanding majority.

The Importance of Term Limits in Africa

Chad’s proposed reform fits a wider African trend in which leaders have sought to bypass or remove constitutional term limits in their countries. Term limits are central to democratic theory: they prevent the excessive concentration of executive power, ensure leadership rotation, and protect checks and balances. Term limits aim to preserve democratic norms by limiting the ability of presidents to dominate legislatures, judiciaries, and other state institutions. Simultaneously, term limits restrict voters from keeping a favoured leader in office, creating tension between stability and democratic choice.

The 1990s wave of constitutional reforms in Africa sought to curb personalistic “Big Man” politics by introducing term limits for presidents. While approximately 75 of the 255 constitutions adopted since independence included term limits, the majority of constitutions post-1989 featured explicit restrictions. However, research shows that many presidents, once in office, have attempted to circumvent these limits through legal reinterpretation, constitutional amendments, or referenda. Globally, approximately 25 percent of term-limited leaders attempt to extend their tenure, with a particularly high success rate in Africa.

Examples of Successful Evasion

Several African leaders have successfully extended their terms, despite constitutional limits. In Rwanda, President Paul Kagame amended the constitution to run for a third, seven-year term. Control over the legislature and judiciary, combined with a popular mandate, allowed the changes to pass through a referendum despite legal challenges.

In Burundi, President Pierre Nkurunziza sought a third term in 2015 despite the Arusha peace agreement and constitutional limits. The Constitutional Court ruled that his first term under transitional arrangements did not count toward the limit, allowing him to run for re-election. He later voluntarily stepped down after his successor was elected in 2020.

Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir also bypassed term limits to pursue a third term. After assuming power in a 1989 coup, Bashir implemented a new constitution in 1998 that introduced two-term limits but managed to remain in office without formally addressing term-limit circumvention through constitutional amendments.

In Cameroon, President Paul Biya leveraged his legislative majority to remove term limits and shield himself from impeachment, remaining in power since 1982 despite opposition boycotts and riots.

Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni eliminated both term and age limits, allowing him to remain in office for decades now. Initially, he removed term limits in 2005 and then abolished the age cap in 2018 to qualify for the 2021 elections.

In the Republic of Congo, President Denis Sassou Nguesso extended term limits while reducing the presidential term length to gain the court’s approval in 2016.

Côte d’Ivoire provides repeated examples: Laurent Gbagbo delayed elections after his first term ended in 2005, while Alassane Ouattara ran for a third term in 2020 despite the constitution limiting presidents to two terms in office. The courts ruled that his initial term under a previous constitution did not count toward the two-term limit.

In Guinea, Alpha Condé initiated a constitutional referendum in 2020 to pursue a third term in office. Allegations of electoral fraud sparked violent protests; however, the Constitutional Court endorsed the reform, allowing Condé to remain in office.

Senegal’s Abdoulaye Wade amended the constitution to “reset” his term limit and ran in 2012, although widespread public protests opposed the move.

Nigeria has historically experienced violent power transitions during periods without term limits, including coups, illustrating the stabilising potential of such constitutional restrictions.

Unsuccessful Attempts to Evade Term Limits

However, not all leaders succeed in bypassing term limits. In Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi attempted to make constitutional changes to extend his tenure in 2002 but ultimately stepped aside after political resistance. Malawi’s Elson Bakili Muluzi tried to abolish term limits in 2002–2003, using parliamentary manipulation and intimidation, yet failed. Zambia’s Fredrick Chiluba similarly withdrew a third-term amendment after party opposition and civil society’s pressure.

In Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré’s attempt to secure a fifth term in 2014 failed amid protests and party defections. Niger’s Mamadou Tandja attempted to bypass term limits via emergency powers, dissolved the courts, and enacted a referendum, but a 2010 coup ended his tenure and restored the constitutional limits.

Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe demonstrates how intra-party dynamics can enforce term limits: after attempting to designate his wife Grace as successor, party opposition led to his removal and resignation, allowing his vice-president Emerson Mnangagwa to assume power.

These cases show that while term limits do not always prevent leaders from extending their tenure, they influence negotiations between presidents, political allies, opposition actors, and civil society. Strong institutions, party resistance, and public mobilisation are often decisive in limiting executive overreach.

Conclusion

Chad’s constitutional reform reflects a broader pattern of term-limit circumvention in Africa. While some presidents have successfully extended their tenure, others have faced constraints from the courts, civil society, and political opposition. The outcomes in countries from Rwanda to Guinea, Uganda to Senegal, and Sudan to Zimbabwe reveal that term limits remain an important, albeit contested, mechanism for regulating presidential power. The effectiveness of these limits depends on institutional strength, popular engagement, and the willingness of political actors to uphold constitutional norms against the ambitions of incumbent leaders.

Bibliography

1. RFI. “Chad's Move to Drop Presidential Term Limits Slammed as 'Burial of Democracy’.” 20 September 2025. https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20250920-chad-move-to-drop-presidential-term-limits-slammed-as-burial-of-democracy

2. T. Ginsburg et al. “Constitutional Amendment and Term Limit Evasion in Africa.” In R. Dixon et al. (eds.), Comparative Constitutional Law in Africa, 45–52. 2022.